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Abstract
We consider a scheduling game in which jobs try to minimize their completion time by
choosing a machine to be processed on. Each machine uses an individual priority list to decide
on the order according to which the jobs on the machine are processed. We characterize four
classes of instances in which a pure Nash equilibrium (NE) is guaranteed to exist, and show,
by means of an example, that none of these characterizations can be relaxed. We then bound
the performance of Nash equilibria for each of these classes with respect to the makespan of
the schedule and the sum of completion times. We also analyze the computational complexity
of several problems arising in this model. For instance, we prove that it is NP-hard to decide
whether a NE exists, and that even for instances with identical machines, for which a NE is
guaranteed to exist, it is NP-hard to approximate the best NE within a factor of 2− 1m − 
for all  > 0.
In addition, we study a generalized model in which players’ strategies are subsets of
resources, each having its own priority list over the players. We show that in this general
model, even unweighted symmetric games may not have a pure NE, and we bound the price
of anarchy with respect to the total players’ costs.
Keywords: Scheduling Games, Priority Lists, Price of Anarchy.
1 Introduction
Scheduling problems have traditionally been studied from a centralized point of view in which
the goal is to find an assignment of jobs to machines so as to minimize some global objective
function. Two of the classical results are that Smith’s rule, i.e., schedule jobs in decreasing
order according to their ratio of weight over processing time, is optimal for single machine
scheduling with the sum of weighted completion times objective [32], and list scheduling, i.e.,
greedily assign the job with the highest priority to a free machine, yields a 2-approximation for
identical machines with the minimum makespan objective [20]. Many modern systems provide
service to multiple strategic users, whose individual payoff is affected by the decisions made by
others. As a result, non-cooperative game theory has become an essential tool in the analysis of
job-scheduling applications. The jobs are controlled by selfish users who independently choose
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which resources to use. The resulting job-scheduling games have by now been widely studied
and many results regarding the efficiency of equilibria in different settings are known.
A particular focus has been placed on finding coordination mechanisms [10], i.e., local
scheduling policies, that induce a good system performance.In these works it is common to
assume that ties are broken in a consistent manner (see, e.g., Immorlica et al. [23]), or that
there are no ties at all (see, e.g., Cole et al. [11]). In practice, there is no real justification
for this assumption, except that it avoids subtle difficulties in the analysis. In this paper we
relax this restrictive assumption and consider the more general setting in which machines have
arbitrary individual priority lists. That is, each machine schedules those jobs that have chosen
it according to its priority list. The priority lists are publicly known to the jobs.
In this paper we analyze the effect of having machine-dependent priority lists on the corre-
sponding job-scheduling game. We study the existence of Nash equilibrium, the complexity of
identifying whether a NE profile exists, the complexity of calculating a NE, in particular a good
one, and the equilibrium inefficiency.
A second motivating application for this paper is traffic networks. A common way to model
a traffic network is by means of a congestion game [30]. However, this model has no element of
time dependence and assumes that all users on a resource experience the same latency. Though
in a road network, a vehicle can only be delayed by the vehicles ahead of it. Farzad et al. [16]
introduced a simple modification that allows to incorporate some element of time dependence.
They proposed a model in which the total cost of a resource is given by the integral under the
cost function. The idea is that the area under the cost function can be divided among the players
so that earlier players are associated with smaller latencies. For atomic players this idea can be
implemented by means of priorities on resources: each player will only delay other players on
the resource that have a lower priority.
1.1 The Model
An instance of a scheduling game with machine-dependent priority lists is given by a tuple
G = 〈N,M, (wi)i∈N , (cj)j∈M , (pij)j∈M 〉 where N is a finite set n ≥ 1 jobs, M is a finite set of
m ≥ 1 machines, wi ∈ R+ is the weight of job i ∈ N , cj ∈ R+ is the processing delay of machine
j ∈ M , and pij : N → {1, . . . , n} is the priority list of machine j ∈ M . In the literature, it
is common to characterize the jobs by their processing time and the machines by their speed.
We prefer to refer to weight instead of to processing time, and to delay, which is the inverse of
speed, in order to be consistent with the general definition of congestion games.
A strategy profile s = (si)i∈N assigns a machine si ∈M to every job i ∈ N . Given a strategy
profile s, the jobs are processed according to their order in the machines’ priority lists. The set
of jobs that delay i in s is Bi(s) = {i′ ∈ N |si′ = si ∧ pisi(i′) ≤ pisi(i)}. Note that job i itself also
belongs to Bi(s). Let w
i(s) =
∑
i′∈Bi(s)
wi′ . The cost of job i ∈ N is equal to its completion time
in s, given by cost i(s) = cj · wi(s).
A more general model is that of a congestion game with resource-dependent priority lists, in
which the strategy space of a player consists of subsets of resources. Formally, an instance of
the general game is given by a tuple G = 〈N,E, (Σi)i∈N , (wi)i∈N , (ce)e∈E , (pie)e∈E〉, where N is
a finite set players, E is a finite set of resources, Σi ⊆ 2E is the set of feasible strategies for
player i ∈ N , wi ∈ R+ is the weight of player i ∈ N , ce ∈ R+ is the cost coefficient of resource
e ∈ E, and pie : N → {1, . . . , n} is the priority list of resource E that defines its preference over
the players using it.
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Scheduling games are symmetric singleton congestion games in which the strategy space of
each job is the set of all machines. For the general setting, the players’ costs are defined as
follows. Given a strategy profile s = (si)i∈N ∈ ×i∈NΣi, for every player i ∈ N , and resource
e ∈ si, let Bie(s) = {i′ ∈ N | e ∈ si′ ∧ pie(i′) ≤ pie(i)}, and define wie(s) =
∑
i′∈Bie(s)
wi′ . The cost
of a player i ∈ N is given by, cost i(s) = wi ·
∑
e∈si ce · wie(s).
Notice that for general congestion games, we assume that players’ costs are multiplied by
their weight, whereas we do not make that assumption for scheduling games. This has no
implications for the existence of Nash equilibria, but only affects the efficiency result.
Each job chooses a strategy so as to minimize its cost. A strategy profile s is a pure Nash
equilibrium (NE) if for all i ∈ N and all s′i ∈ Σi, we have cost i(s) ≤ cost i(s′i, s−i). Let E(G)
denote the set of Nash equilibria for a given instance G. Notice that E(G) may be empty.
For a profile s, let cost(s) denote the cost of s. The cost is defined with respect to some
objective. For example, the total players’ cost or the maximum cost of a player. It is well known
that decentralized decision-making may lead to sub-optimal solutions from the point of view of
the society as a whole. For a game G, let P (G) be the set of feasible profiles of G. We denote
by OPT (G) the cost of a social optimal (SO) solution; i.e., OPT (G) = mins∈P (G) cost(s). We
quantify the inefficiency incurred due to self-interested behavior according to the price of anarchy
(PoA) [27] and price of stability (PoS) [3] measures. The PoA is the worst-case inefficiency of
a pure Nash equilibrium, while the PoS measures the best-case inefficiency of a pure Nash
equilibrium.
Definition 1.1 Let G be a family of games, and let G be a game in G. Let E(G) be the set of
pure Nash equilibria of the game G. Assume that E(G) 6= ∅.
• The price of anarchy of G is the ratio between the maximal cost of a NE and the social
optimum of G. That is, PoA(G) = maxs∈E(G) cost(s)/OPT (G). The price of anarchy of
the family of games G is PoA(G) = supG∈GPoA(G).
• The price of stability of G is the ratio between the minimal cost of a NE and the social
optimum of G. That is, PoS(G) = mins∈E(G) cost(s)/OPT (G). The price of stability of
the family of games G is PoS(G) = supG∈GPoS(G).
1.2 Our Contribution
We start by studying scheduling games, i.e., each job has to choose one machine to be processed
on, and then based on the choices of the jobs, each machine schedules the jobs according to its
individual priority list. We first show that a Nash equilibrium in general need not exist, and use
this example to show that it is NP-complete to decide whether a particular game has a Nash
equilibrium. We then extend known results in order to provide a characterization of instances
in which a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist. Specifically, existence is guaranteed
if the game belongs to at least one of the following four classes: G1 : all jobs have the same
weight, G2 : there are two machines, G3 : all machines have the same processing delay (shown
in [13]), and G4 : all machines have the same priority list (shown in [16]). For all four of these
classes, there is a polynomial time algorithm that computes a Nash equilibrium. In fact, if jobs
are unweighted, better-response dynamics converge to a Nash equilibrium in polynomial time.
This characterization is tight in a sense that our inexistence example disobeys it in a minimal
3
way: it describes a game on three machines, two of them having the same processing delay and
the same priority list.
We analyze the efficiency of Nash equilibria by means of two different measures of efficiency:
the makespan, i.e., the maximum completion time of a job, and the sum of completion times.
For all four classes of games with a guaranteed Nash equilibrium we provide tight bounds for
the price of anarchy and the price of stability with respect to both measures. Our results are
summarized in Table 1.
Instance class \ Objective Makespan Sum of Completion Times
PoA PoS PoA PoS
G1 : Unweighted jobs 1 1 1 1
G2 : Two machines (
√
5 + 1)/2 (
√
5 + 1)/2 Θ(n) Θ(n)
G3 : Identical machines 2− 1/m 2− 1/m Θ(n/m) Θ(n/m)
G4 : Global priority list Θ(m) Θ(m) Θ(n) Θ(n)
Table 1: Our results for the equilibrium inefficiency.
(i) If jobs are unweighted, we show that the price of anarchy is equal to 1, which means that
selfish behavior is optimal. (ii) For two machines with processing delays 1 and c ≥ 1, we prove
that the PoA and the PoS are at most 1+ cc+1 if c ≤
√
5+1
2 , and 1+
1
c if c ≥
√
5+1
2 . Our analysis is
tight for all c ≥ 1. The maximal inefficiency, listed in Table 1, is achieved with c =
√
5+1
2 . In case
the sum of completion times is considered as an objective, the price of anarchy can grow linearly
in the number of jobs. (iii) If machines have identical speeds, but potentially different priority
lists, the price of anarchy with respect to the makespan is equal to 2− 1/m. The upper bound
follows because every Nash equilibrium can be seen as an outcome of Graham’s List-Scheduling
algorithm. The lower bound example shows the bound is tight, even with respect to the price
of stability. For the sum of completion times objective, we show that the price of anarchy is at
most O(n/m), and provide a lower bound example for which the price of stability grows in the
order of O(n/m). (iv) If there is a global priority list, and machines have arbitrary processing
delays, we show that the Θ(m)-approximation of List-Scheduling carry over for the makespan
inefficiency, and the results of (ii) carry over for the sum of completion times.
In terms of computational complexity, we prove that it is NP-hard to approximate the best
NE within a factor of 2 − 1m −  for all  > 0 if machines have identical processing delays and
the minimum makespan objective is considered. Recall that 2 − 1m is the price of anarchy for
these instances. In particular, this implies that the simple greedy algorithm that computes a
Nash equilibrium by letting each machine with the current least load get the most preferred
unassigned job, is the best one can hope for.
We finally generalize the model to allow for arbitrary strategy sets. We show that in general,
even with unweighted jobs, a Nash equilibrium need not exist by making use of the famous
Condorcet paradox [12]. We then use this example to prove that the question whether a Nash
equilibrium exists is NP-hard, even with unweighted jobs. We lastly study the price of anarchy
with respect to the sum of weighted costs and show that the upper bound of 4 proven by Cole
et al. [11] for unrelated machine scheduling with Smith’s rule also extends to congestion games
with resource-dependent priority lists. This ratio is smaller than the price of anarchy of the
atomic game with priorities defined by Farzad et al. [16].
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1.3 Related Work
Scheduling games. The existence and efficiency of Nash equilibria in scheduling games gained
lots of attention over the recent years. We refer to Vo¨cking [33] for a recent overview. For
existence, Immorlica et al [23] proved that for unrelated machines, i.e., different machines can
have different processing times for jobs, and priority lists based on shortest processing time first
with consistent tie-breaking, the set a Nash equilibria is always non-empty and corresponds to
the set of solutions of the Ibarra-Kim algorithm. This result is also proven in Heydenreich et
al. [21]. A Nash equilibrium is in fact reached after n rounds of best-responses. It remains
open whether a Nash equilibrium exists for unrelated machines and priority lists based on
either longest processing time first with consistent tie-breaking or a random order. Du¨rr and
Nguyen [15] proved that a potential and thus a Nash equilibrium exists for two machines with
a random order and balanced jobs, whereas no potential exists for three or more machines.
Azar et al. [6] showed that for unrelated machines with priorities based on the ratio of a job’s
processing time to its faster processing time, there need not be a Nash equilibrium. Lu and
Yu [28] proposed the so-called group-makespan mechanism that guarantees the existence of a
Nash equilibrium.
The standard measure for the efficiency of Nash equilibria is the price of anarchy [27]. This
measure has been widely studied for different measures of efficiency. Most attention has been
addressed on minimizing the makespan. Czumaj and Vo¨cking [14] gave tight bounds for related
machines that grow as the number of machines grows, whereas Awerbuch et al. [5] and Gairing
et al. [18] provided tight bounds for restricted machine settings. An alternative measure of
efficiency is utilitarian social welfare, that is, the sum of weighted completion times. Correa and
Queyranne [13] proved a tight upper bound of 4 for restricted related machines with priority
lists derived from Smith’s rule. Cole et al. [11] generalized the bound of 4 to unrelated machines
with Smith’s rule. Hoeksma and Uetz [22] gave a tighter bound for the more restricted setting
in which jobs have unit weights and machines are related.
Christodoulou et al. [10] introduced the idea of using coordination mechanisms, i.e., local
functions that specify the costs of the jobs as a function of the vector of weights, to improve
the performance of these games. Immorlica et al. [23] studied coordination mechanisms based
on shortest and longest processing times first. Kollias [26] considered non-preemptive coor-
dination mechanism and shows that preemption is necessary to improve lower bounds on the
price of anarchy lower bounds. In fact, Caragiannis et al. [7] proposed a framework that uses
price of anarchy results of Nash equilibria in scheduling games to come up with combinatorial
approximation algorithms for the centralized problem.
Congestion games. Rosenthal [30] proved that congestion games are potential games and
thus have a pure Nash equilibrium. Awerbuch et al. [4] and Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [9]
proved a tight bound of 5/2 for affine congestion games, and 2.618 for weighted affine congestion
games. Fotakis et al. [17] showed that weighted congestion games need not have a pure Nash
equilibrium, unless we restrict cost functions to be linear. Ackermann et al. [2] proved that as
long as strategy spaces are restricted to be matroidal, then a Nash equilibrium always exists.
Congestion games with priorities. Rosenthal [30] proved that congestion games are
potential games and thus have a pure Nash equilibrium. Ackermann et al. [1] were the first to
study a congestion game with priorities. They proposed a model in which users with higher
priority on a resource displace users with lower priorities such that the latter incur infinite
cost. Farzad et al. [16] studied priority based selfish routing for non-atomic and atomic users
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and analyzed the inefficiency of equilibrium. Gourve`s et al. [19] studied capacitated congestion
games to characterize the existence of pure Nash equilibria and computation of an equilibrium
when they exist. Piliouras et al. [29] assumed that the priority lists are unknown to the players
a priori and consider different risk attitudes towards having a uniform at random ordering.
2 Equilibrium Existence and Computation
In this section we give a precise characterization of instances that are guaranteed to have a NE.
The conditions that we provide are sufficient but not necessary. A natural question is to decide
whether a given game instance that does not fulfill any of the conditions has a NE. We show
that answering this question is an NP-complete problem.
We first show that a NE may not exist, even with only three machines, two of which have
the same delay and the same priority list.
Example 2.1 Consider the game G∗ with 5 jobs, N = {a, b, c, d, e}, and three machines, M =
{M1,M2,M3}, with pi1 = (a, b, c, d, e), and pi2 = pi3 = (e, d, b, c, a). The first machine has
delay c1 = 1 while the two other machines have delay c2 = c3 = 2. The job weights are
wa = 5, wb = 4, wc = 4 + 2, wd = 9 + , and we = 2, where  > 0 but small.
Job a is clearly on M1 in every NE. It is easy to see that in every NE at least one of b, c
and d is on M1. Therefore, job e is first on M2 or M3. Since these two machines have the
same priority list and the same delay function, we can assume w.l.o.g., that if a NE exists, then
there exists a NE in which job e is on M3. We show that no NE exists by considering the three
possible strategies of job b.
1. b is on M1: If d is not on M2 or M3, then b prefers M2 to M1. If d is on M2, then c is
on M3 (since 12 + 4 < 13 + 2). As a result, d prefers M1 (since 18 +  < 18 + 2), so b
prefers M2. Finally, given that e is on M3, d is not on M3.
2. b is on M2: job c prefers M1, where it completes at time 9 + 2, while after e on M3 it
completes at time 12 + 4. Now d prefers M2, (since 18 + 2 < 18 + 3). So b prefers M1.
3. b is on M3: Being after e, job b prefers M1.
Thus, the game G∗ has no pure Nash equilibrium.
We can use the above example to show that deciding whether a game instance has a NE is
NP-complete by using a reduction from 3-bounded 3-dimensional matching.
Theorem 2.1 Given an instance of a scheduling game, it is NP-complete to decide whether the
game has a NE.
Proof: Given a game and a profile s, verifying whether s is a NE can be done by checking
for every job whether its current assignment is also its best-response, therefore the problem is
in NP.
The hardness proof is by a reduction from 3-bounded 3-dimensional matching (3DM-3). The
input to the 3DM-3 problem is a set of triplets T ⊆ X×Y ×Z, where |X| = |Y | = |Z| = n. The
number of occurrences of every element of X ∪ Y ∪Z in T is at most 3. The number of triplets
is |T | ≥ n. The goal is to decide whether T has a 3-dimensional matching of size n, i.e., there
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exists a subset T ′ ⊆ T , such that |T ′| = n, and every element in X ∪Y ∪Z appears exactly once
in T ′. 3DM-3 is known to be NP-hard [24].
Given an instance of 3DM-3 matching and  > 0, we construct the following scheduling
game. The set of jobs consists of:
1. The 5 jobs {a, b, c, d, e} from the game G∗ in Example 2.1.
2. A single dummy job, f , of weight 2.
3. A set D of |T | − n dummy jobs of weight 3.
4. A set U of |T |+ 1 dummy jobs of weight 20.
5. 3n jobs of weight 1 - one for each element in X ∪ Y ∪ Z.
There are m = |T |+ 4 machines, M1,M2, . . . ,M|T |+4. All the machines except for M2 and M3
have delay cj = 1. For M2 and M3, c2 = c3 = 2.
The heart of the reduction lies in determining the priority lists. The first three machines
will mimic the no-NE game G∗ from Example 2.1. Note that if job e is missing from G∗ then
there exists a NE of {a, b, c, d} on M1,M2,M3. The idea is that if a 3DM-3 matching exists,
then job e would prefer M4 and leave the first three machines for {a, b, c, d}. However, if there
is no 3DM-3, then some job originated from the elements in X ∪ Y ∪ Z will precede job e on
M4, and e’s best-response would be on M2 or M3 - where it is guaranteed to have completion
time 4, and the no-NE game G∗ would come to life. The dummy jobs in U are long enough to
guarantee that each of the jobs {a, b, c, d} prefers the first three machines over the last |T | + 1
machines.
The priority lists are defined as follows. When the list includes a set, it means that the set
elements appear in arbitrary order. For the first machine, pi1 = (a, b, c, d, e, f, U,X, Y, Z,D).
For the second and third machines, pi2 = pi3 = (e, d, b, c, a, f, u,X, Y, Z,D). For the forth
machine, pi4 = (f,X, Y, Z, e, U,D, a, b, c, d). The remaining |T | machines are triplet-machines.
For every t = (xi, yj , zk) ∈ T , the priority list of the triplet-machine corresponding to t is
(D,xi, yj , zk, U, f,X \ {xj}, Y \ {yj}, Z \ {zj}, a, b, c, d, e).
Observe that in any NE, the dummy job f of weight 2 is assigned as the first jobs on M4.
Also, the dummy jobs in D have the highest priority on the triplet-machines, thus, in every NE,
there are |D| = |T |−n triplet-machines on which the first job is from D. Finally, it is easy to see
that in every NE there is exactly one dummy job from U on each of the last |T |+ 1 machines.
Figure 1 provides an example for n = 2 and |T | = 3.
Claim 2.2 If a 3D-matching of size n exists, then the game has a NE.
Proof: Let T ′ be a matching of size n. Assign the jobs of X ∪ Y ∪Z on the triplet-machines
corresponding to T ′ and the jobs of D on the remaining triplet-machines. Assign f and e on
M4. Also, assign a single job from U on all but the first 3 machines. We are left with the jobs
a, b, c, d that are assigned on the first three machines: a and d on M1, b on M2 and c on M3. It
is easy to verify that the resulting assignment is a NE. The crucial observation is that all the
jobs originated from X ∪ Y ∪ Z completes at time at most 3, and therefore have no incentive
to select M4. Thus, job e completes at time 4 on M4 and therefore, has no incentive to join the
no-NE game on the first three machines.
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Figure 1: (a) Let T = {(x1, y1, z1), (x2, y2, z2), (x1, y2, z2)}. A matching of size 2 exists. Job e
is assigned on M4, a NE exists. (b) Let T = {(x1, y1, z1), (x2, y2, z1), (x1, y2, z2)}. A matching
of size 2 does not exist. Job e is not assigned on M4 and the no-NE game G
∗ is induced on the
first three machines.
Claim 2.3 If a 3D-matching of size n does not exist, then the game has no NE.
Proof: Since a matching does not exist, at least one job from X ∪ Y ∪ Z, is not assigned
on its triplet machine, and thus prefers M4, where its completion time is 3. Thus, job e prefers
to be first on M2 or M2, where its completion time is 4. The long dummy jobs guarantee that
machines M1,M2 and M3 attracts exactly the 5 jobs {a, b, c, d, e} and the no-NE game is played
on the first three machines.
By combining the two claims, the reduction proof is complete.
Our next results are positive. When combined with known results regarding equilibrium
existence, and our example above, we get a tight characterization of classes of instances with a
guaranteed Nash equilibrium.
The following algorithm is intended for instances in the class G1, that is, for all i, wi = 1. It
assigns the jobs greedily, where in each step, a job is added on a machine on which the cost of
the next job is minimal.
Algorithm 1 Calculating a NE of unit-weight jobs on related machines
1: Let `j denote the number of jobs assigned on machine j. Initially, `j = 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
2: repeat
3: Let j? = arg minj cj · (`j + 1).
4: Assign on machine j? the first unassigned job on its priority list.
5: `j? = `j? + 1.
6: until all jobs are scheduled
Theorem 2.4 If for all jobs wi = 1, then Algorithm 1 calculates a NE.
Proof: Let s? be the schedule produced by Algorithm 1. We show that s? is a NE. Note
that the jobs are assigned one after the other according to their completion time in s?. That
is, if j1 is assigned before j2 then costj1(s
?) ≤ costj2(s?). Assume by contradiction that s?
8
is not a NE, and let i be a job that can migrate from its current machine to machine j and
reduce its completion time. Assume that if it migrates, then i would be assigned as the k-th
job on machine j. This contradicts the choice of the algorithm when the k-th job on machine
i is assigned - since j should have been selected. If no job is k-th on machine i, then we get a
contradiction to the assignment of i.
In fact, for the unweighted case, every sequence of better responses converges in polynomial
time. Given a strategy profile s, a strategy s′i for job i ∈ N is a better response if costi(s′i, s−i) <
costi(s).
Theorem 2.5 If for all jobs wi = 1, then jobs reach an equilibrium after polynomially many
better response moves.
Proof: We analyze a potential function that is introduced by Gourve`s et al. [19]. Define the
rank of job i ∈ N on machine j ∈M by r(i, j) = |{i′ ∈ N | pij(i′) ≤ pij(i)}|. Let s be a strategy
profile. For all j ∈ M , we define Nj(s) = {i′ ∈ N | si′ = j}, we write Nj(s) = {i1, . . . , ikj},
where i1 is the job with the highest priority choosing machine j and ikj is the job with the lowest
priority choosing machine j (in particular, there are kj jobs choosing machine j), and we define
nij(s) = |Bi(s)| for all i ∈ Nj(s). With each machine j ∈ M , we associate a multiset f(j, s) of
elements {(cj , r(i1, j)), . . . , (cj · kj , r(ikj , j))}. We define f(s) =
⋃
j∈M
f(j, s).
For a value u ∈ R+, define the multiset σu = {(c, r) ∈ f(s) | c ≤ u} for a given strategy
profile s. Moreover, define ||σu|| =
∑
(c,r)∈σu r. By the definition, σu is the number of elements
corresponding to profile s with costs less than u and ||σu|| is the total sum of ranks of these
elements. We define a partial order ≺ on strategy profiles. Two strategy profile s, s′ satisfy
s′ ≺ s if for the smallest u ∈ R+ such that (|σu|, ||σu||) 6= (|σ′u|, ||σ′u||), we have |σu| < |σ′u|,
or |σu| = |σ′u| and ||σu|| > ||σ′u||. In other words, a strategy profile s′ is smaller than strategy
profile s if for the smallest u for which (|σu|, ||σu||) 6= (|σ′u|, ||σ′u||), we have that there are more
elements in σ′u with costs less than u, or there are an equal number of elements with costs less
than u, but then the sum of ranks is smaller.
Let i ∈ N and si = j. Suppose that s′i = j′ is a better response for i given s. We show
that (s′i, s−i) ≺ s. We can restrict attention to machines j and j′. Observe that the costs of the
smallest element that is different between f(s) and f(s′i, s−i) are equal to cj′ · nij′(s′i, s−i). But
then two cases could occur: either there is no lower priority job on j′ and then an element with
cost cj′ · nij′(s′i, s−i) is added which is smaller than cj · nij(s), or there is a lower priority job on
j′, but then job i has a better ranking than that job and thus we have in both cases that s′ ≺ s.
Now we bound the number of strategy changes to reach a Nash equilibrium from arbitrary
profile in better responses. Let s be an arbitrary strategy profile. By definition of order ≺,
there are at most n2m values of u that we have to consider. Moreover, for each u, 0 ≤ |σu| ≤ n
and 0 ≤ ||σu|| ≤ n(n+1)2 . Hence, there are at most O(n5m) elements (|σu|, ||σu||) which are
≺-different. Thus, from an arbitrary profile, better responses converges to a Nash equilibrium
in at most O(n5m) strategy changes.
Our next result considers the number of machines and completes the picture. Since our
inexistence example uses three machines, out of which two are identical (in both delay and
priority list), we cannot hope for a wider positive result.
Theorem 2.6 If m ≤ 2, then a NE exists and can be calculated efficiently.
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Proof: For a single machine, the priority list defines the only feasible schedule, which is
clearly a NE. For m = 2, assume w.l.o.g., that c1 = 1 and c2 = c ≥ 1. Consider the following
algorithm, which initially assigns all the jobs on the fast machine. Then, the jobs are considered
according to their order in pi2, and every job gets an opportunity to migrate to M2.
Algorithm 2 Calculating a NE schedule on two related machines
1: Assign all the jobs on M1 (the fast machine) according to their order in pi1.
2: For 1 ≤ k ≤ n, let the job i for which pi2(i) = k perform a best-response move (migrate to
M2 if this reduces its completion time).
Denote by s1 the schedule after the first step of the algorithm (where all the jobs are on
M1), and let s denote the schedule after the algorithm terminates. We show that s is a NE.
Claim 2.7 No job for which si = 1 has a beneficial migration.
Proof: Assume by contradiction that job i is assigned on M1 and has a beneficial migration.
Assume that pi2(i) = k. Job i was offered to perform a migration in the k-th iteration of step 2
of the algorithm, but chose to remain on M1. The only migrations that took place after the k-th
iteration are from M1 to M2. Thus, if migrating is beneficial for i after the algorithm completes,
it should have been beneficial also during the algorithm, contradicting its choice to remain on
M1.
Claim 2.8 No job for which si = 2 has a beneficial migration.
Proof: Assume by contradiction that the claim is false and let i be the first job on M2
(first with respect to pi2) that may benefit from returning to M1. Let s1 denote the schedule
before job i migrates to M2 - during the second step of the algorithm. Recall that cost i(s) is the
completion time of job i on M2, and cost i(s1) is its completion time on M1 before its migration.
Since the jobs are activated according to pi2 in the 2-nd step of the algorithm, no jobs are
added before job i on M2. Job i may be interested in returning to M1 only if some jobs that
were processed before it on M1, move to M2 after its migration. Denote by ∆ the set of these
jobs, and let δ be their total weight. Let i′ be the last job from ∆ to complete its processing
in s. Since job i′ performs its migration out of M1 after job i, and jobs do not join M1 during
step 2 of the algorithm, the completion time of i′ when it performs the migration is at most
cost i′(s1). The migration from M1 to M2 is beneficial for i
′, thus, cost i′(s) < cost i′(s1).
The jobs in ∆ are all before job i in pi1 and after job i in pi2. Therefore, cost i′(s1) < cost i(s1),
and cost i′(s) ≥ cost i(s) + cδ. Finally, we assume that s is not stable and i would like to return
to M1. By returning, its completion time would be cost i(s1) − δ. Given that the migration is
beneficial for i, and that i is the first job who likes to return to M2, we have that cost i(s1)− δ <
cost i(s).
Combining the above inequalities, we get
cost i(s1) < cost i(s) + δ ≤ cost i′(s)− (c− 1)δ < cost i′(s1)− (c− 1)δ < cost i(s1)− (c− 1)δ.
This contradicts the fact that c ≥ 1 and δ ≥ 0.
By combining the two claims, we conclude that s is a NE.
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3 Equilibrium Inefficiency
Two common measures for evaluating the quality of a schedule are the makespan, given by
Cmax(s) = maxi∈N cost i(s), and the sum of completion times, given by
∑
i∈N cost i(s). In this
section we analyze the equilibrium inefficiency with respect to each of the two objectives, for
each of the four classes for which a NE is guaranteed to exist.
We begin with G1, the class of instances with unweighted jobs. For this class we show that
allowing arbitrary priority lists does not hurt the social cost, even on machines with different
speeds.
Theorem 3.1 PoA(G1) = PoS(G1) = 1 for both the min-makespan and the sum of completion
times objective.
Proof: Let s be a schedule of unit-weight jobs. The quality of s is characterized by the vector
(n1(s), n2(s), . . . , nm(s)) specifying the number of jobs on each machine. The makespan of s is
given by maxj cj · nj(s), and the sum of completion times in s is
∑
j cj · nj(s)(nj(s)+1)2 .
Recall Algoirthm 1 that assigns the jobs greedily, where on each step a job is added on a
machine on which the cost of the next job is minimized. Let s? denote the resulting schedule,
and let cost1(s
?) ≤ cost2(s?) ≤ . . . ≤ costn(s?) be the sorted vector of jobs’ costs (that is,
completion times) in s?. By the algorithm, this is also the order according to which the jobs are
assigned. We show that every NE schedule has the same sorted cost vector as s?, and that this
vector achieves both minimum makespan and minimum sum of completion times.
Let s be a NE schedule with sorted cost vector and let cost1(s) ≤ cost2(s) ≤ . . . ≤ costn(s),
and assume by contradiction that it has a different cost vector. Let i be the minimal index such
that cost i(s
?) 6= cost i(s). Since s and s? agree on the costs of the first i − 1 jobs, and since
s? assigns the i-th job on a minimal-cost machine, it holds that cost i(s
?) < cost i(s). We get a
contradiction to the stability of s - since some job can reduce its cost to cost i(s
?).
The following Lemma, whose proof is given in the Appendix, completes the proof.
Lemma 3.2 The schedule s? is optimal with respect to makespan and sum of completion times
objectives.
Proof: We show that s? achieves the minimum makespan. Assume that there exists a
schedule s′ such that maxj cj ·nj(s′) < maxj cj ·nj(s?). Let M1 = argmaxjcj ·nj(s?). It must be
that nM1(s
′) < nM1(s?). Since
∑
j nj(s
′) =
∑
j nj(s
?) = n, there must be a machine M2 such
that nM2(s
?) < nM2(s
′). Thus, the last job on machine M1 in s? can benefit from migrating to
machine M2, as its cost will be at most cM2 · (nM2(s?) + 1) ≤ cM2 · nM2(s′) ≤ maxj cj · nj(s′) <
maxj cj · nj(s?). This contradicts the assumption that s? is a NE.
Next, we analyze the sum of completion times objective. For a schedule s, the sum of
completion times is
∑
j cj · (1 + . . . + nj). Using similar arguments, if s? is not optimal with
respect to the sum of completion times, there exists a beneficial migration from a machine whose
contribution to the sum is maximal, to a machine with a lower contribution.
In Theorem 2.6 it is shown that a NE exists for any instance on two related machines. We
now analyze the equilibrium inefficiency of this class. Let Gc2 denote the class of games played
on two machines with delays c1 = 1 and c2 = c ≥ 1.
Theorem 3.3 For the min-makespan objective, PoA(Gc2) =PoS(Gc2) = 1 + 1c if c ≥
√
5+1
2 , and
PoA(Gc2) =PoS(Gc2) = 1 + cc+1 if c ≤
√
5+1
2 .
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Proof: Let G ∈ Gc2. Let W =
∑
iwi be the total weight of all jobs. Assume first that
c ≥
√
5+1
2 . For the minimum makespan objective, OPT (G) ≥ W/(1 + 1/c). Also, for any NE
s, we have that Cmax(s) ≤ W , since every job can migrate to be last on the fast machine and
have completion time at most W . Thus, PoA ≤ 1 + 1/c.
Assume next that c <
√
5+1
2 . Let job a be a last job to complete in a worst Nash equilibrium
s, w1 be the total weight of all jobs different from a on machine 1, and w2 be the total weight of
all jobs different from a on machine 2 in s. Then since s is a Nash equilibrium, Cmax(s) ≤ w1+wa
and Cmax(s) ≤ c · (w2 + wa). Combining these two inequalities yields
Cmax(s) ≤ W + wa
1 + 1c
≤ (1 + c/(c+ 1)) ·OPT (G),
where for the inequality we use that OPT (G) ≥ W/(1 + 1/c) and OPT (G) ≥ wa, and thus
PoA≤ 1 + c/(c+ 1).
For the PoS lower bound, assume first that c >
√
5+1
2 . Consider an instance consisting of two
jobs, a and b, where wa = 1 and wb = c. The priority lists are pi1 = pi2 = (a, b). The unique NE
is that both jobs are on the fast machine. costa(s) = 1, costb(s) = c+ 1. For every c >
√
5+1
2 , it
holds that c+ 1 < c2, therefore, job b does not have a beneficial migration. An optimal schedule
assigns job a on the slow machine, and both jobs complete at time c. The corresponding PoS is
c+1
c = 1 +
1
c .
1
Assume now that c <
√
5+1
2 . Consider an instance consisting of three jobs, x, y and z, where
wx = 1, wy =
1+c−c2
c2
, and wz =
1+c
c . The priority lists are pi1 = pi2 = (x, y, z). Note that
wy ≥ 0 for every c ≤
√
5+1
2 . The unique NE is when jobs x and z are on the fast machine,
and job y on the slow machine. Indeed, job y prefers being alone on the slow machine since
1+c
c2
> 1+c−c
2
c . Job z prefers joining x on the fast machine since 1 + wz < c(wy + wz). The
makespan is 1 +wz =
1+2c
c . In an optimal schedule, job z is alone on the fast machine, and jobs
x and y are on the slow machine. Both machines have the same completion time 1+cc . The PoS
is 1+2c1+c = 1 +
c
c+1 .
Theorem 3.4 For the sum of completion times objective, PoA(Gc2) = Θ(n) and PoS(Gc2) = Θ(n)
for all c ≥ 1.
Proof: For the upper bound, note that OPT (G) ≥ ∑iwi and in every NE schedule s,
cost i(s) ≤
∑
iwi. This implies PoA = θ(n). For the PoS lower bound, consider an instance
consisting of a set Z of n− 2 jobs of weight , and two jobs, a and b, where wa = 1 and wb = 1c .
The priority lists are pi1 = pi2 = (a, b, Z). Note that wa + wb > cwb, therefore, in every NE, job
a is first on M1 and job b is first on M2. Thus, every -job has completion time at least 1. The
total completion time is at least n + O(n2). An optimal schedule assigns a and b on M1 and
all the -jobs on M2. The total completion time is at most 3 +O(n
2)c. For small enough , we
get that the PoS is Θ(n).
We turn to analyze the equilibrium inefficiency of the class G3, consisting of games played
on identical-speed machines, having machine-based priority lists. The proof of the following
theorem is based on the observation that every NE schedule is a possible outcome of Graham’s
List-scheduling (LS) algorithm [20].
1For c =
√
5+1
2
, by taking wb = c+ , the PoS approaches 1 + c/(c+ 1) as → 0.
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Theorem 3.5 For the min-makespan objective, PoA(G3) =PoS (G3) = 2− 1m .
Proof: Let s be a NE schedule. We claim that s is a possible outcome of Graham’s List-
scheduling algorithm [20]. Indeed, assume that List-scheduling is performed and the jobs are
considered according to their start time in s. Every job selects its machine in s, as otherwise, we
get a contradiction to the stability of s. Since List-scheduling provides a 2− 1m approximation
to the makespan, we get the upper bound of the PoA.
For the lower bound, given m > 1, the following is an instance for which PoS= 2− 1m . The
instance consists of a single job of weight m and m(m − 1) unit-weight jobs. In all priority
lists, the heavy job is last and the unit-weight jobs are prioritized arbitrarily. It is easy to
verify that in every NE profile the unit-weight jobs are partitioned in a balanced way among the
machines, and the heavy job is assigned as last on one of the machines. Thus, the completion
time of the heavy job is 2m − 1. On the other hand, an optimal assignment assign the heavy
job on a dedicated machine, and partition the unit-weight job in a balanced way among the
remaining m − 1 machines. In this profile, all the machines have load m. The corresponding
PoS is 2m−1m = 2− 1m .
Theorem 3.6 For the sum of completion times objective, PoA(G3) ≤ n−1m + 1, and for every
 > 0, PoS(G3) ≥ nm − .
Proof: For the upper bound of the PoA, note that, independent of the number of machines,
the total completion time is at least
∑
iwi. Also, for every job a, if a is not assigned on any
machine, then there exists a machine with load at most
∑
i 6=a wi
m , therefore, in every NE profile,
the completion time of job a is at most
∑
i 6=a wi
m + wa. Summing this equation for all the jobs,
we get that the total completion time of any NE is at most
n
∑
iwi −
∑
iwi
m
+
∑
i
wi =
∑
i
wi
n− 1
m
+ 1.
We conclude that the PoA is at most n−1m + 1.
For the PoS lower bound, given m, let  → 0, and consider an instance with n = km jobs,
out of which, m jobs j1, . . . , jm have length 1 and the other (k−1)m jobs have length . Assume
that pii gives the highest priority to ji then to all the -jobs, and then to the other m − 1 unit
jobs.
In every NE, machine i processes first the unit-job ji, followed by k − 1 -jobs. Thus, every
job has completion time at least 1. The sum of completion times is n+O(mk2). On the other
hand, an optimal solution assigns on machine i a set of k − 1 -jobs followed by one unit-job jk
for k 6= i, resulting in total completion time m+O(mk2). The PoS tends to nm as  decreases.
The last class of instances for which a NE is guaranteed to exist includes games with a global
priority list, and is denoted by G4. It is easy to verify that for this class, the only NE profiles are
those produced by List-Scheduling algorithm, where the jobs are considered according to their
order in the priority list. Different NE may be produced by different tie-breaking rules. Thus,
the equilibrium inefficiency is identical to the approximation ratio of LS [8]. Since the analysis
of LS is tight, this is also the PoS.
Theorem 3.7 For the min-makespan objective, PoS(G4) =PoA(G4) = Θ(m).
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For the sum of completion times objective, we note that the proof of Theorem 3.4 for two
related machines uses a global priority list. The analysis of the PoA is independent of the
number and delays of machines.
Theorem 3.8 For the sum of completion times objective, PoA(G4) = Θ(n) and PoS(G4) =
Θ(n).
3.1 Hardness of Approximating the Minimum Makespan NE
Correa and Queyranne [13] showed that if all the machines have the same speeds, but arbitrary
priority lists, then a NE is guaranteed to exist, and can be calculated by a simple greedy
algorithm. In Theorem 3.5, we have shown that the PoA is at most 2− 1m . In this subsection,
we show that we cannot hope for a better algorithm than the simple greedy algorithm. More
formally, we prove that it is NP-hard to approximate the best NE within a factor of 2− 1m − 
for all  > 0.
Theorem 3.9 If for all machines cj = 1, then it is NP-hard to approximate the best NE w.r.t.
the makespan objective within a factor of 2− 1m −  for all  > 0.
Proof: We show that for every  > 0, there is an instance on m identical machines for which
it is NP-hard to distinguish whether the game has a NE profile with makespan at most m+ 2
or at least 2m− 1.
The hardness proof is by a reduction from 3-bounded 3-dimensional matching (3DM-3),
defined in the proof of Theorem 2.1.
Given an instance of 3DM-3 and  > 0, consider the following game on m = |T |+2 machines,
M1,M2, . . . ,M|T |+2. The set of jobs includes job a of weight m, job b of weight m− 1, a set D
of |T | − n dummy jobs of weight 3, two dummy jobs d1, d2 of weight 2, a set U of (m − 1)2
unit-weight jobs, and 3n jobs of weight  - one for each element in X ∪ Y ∪ Z.
We turn to describe the priority lists. When the list includes a set, it means that the
set elements appear in arbitrary order. For the first machine, pi1 = (d1, b, a, U,X, Y, Z,D, d2).
For the second machine, pi2 = (d2, X, Y, Z, b, U, a, d1). The m − 2 right machines are triplet-
machines. For every t = (xi, yj , zk) ∈ T , the priority list of the triplet-machine corresponding
to t is (D,xi, yj , zk, U,X \ {xj}, Y \ {yj}, Z \ {zj}, d1, d2, a, b).
The heart of the reduction lies in determining the priority lists. The idea is that if a 3D-
matching exists, then job b would prefer M2 and let job a be assigned early on M1. However, if
there is no 3D-matching, then some job originated from the elements in X ∪ Y ∪Z will precede
job b on M2, and b’s best-response would be on M1. The jobs in U have higher priority than job
a on all the machines except for M1, thus, unless job a is on M1, it is assigned after |U |/(m− 1)
unit-jobs from U , inducing a schedule with high makespan.
Observe that in any NE, the two dummy jobs of weight 2 are assigned as the first jobs on
M1 and M2. Also, the dummy jobs in D have the highest priority on the triplet-machines, thus,
in every NE, there are |D| = |T | − n triplet-machines on which the first job is from D.
The following two claims complete the proof. Figure 2 provides an example for m = 5.
Claim 3.10 If a 3D-matching of size n exists, then the game has a NE schedule whose makespan
is m+ 2.
14
T={(x1,y1,z1),(x2,y2,z2),(x1,y2,z2)}
A matching exists.
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Figure 2: (a) A NE schedule for n = 2 and T = {(x1, y1, z1), (x2, y2, z2), (x1, y2, z2)}.
A matching of size 2 exists. T e makespan is 5 + 3. (b) A NE schedule for T =
{(x1, y1, z1), (x2, y2, z1), (x1, y2, z2)}. A matching of size 2 does not exist. The makespan is
9 + 2.
Proof: Let T ′ be a matching of size n. Assign the jobs of X ∪ Y ∪Z on the triplet-machines
corresponding to T ′ and the jobs of D on the remaining triplet-machines. Also, assign d1 and
d2 on M1 and M2 respectively. M1 and M2 now have load 2 while the triplet machines have
load 3. Next, assign job a on M1 and job b on M2. Finally, add the unit-jobs as balanced as
possible: m jobs on each triplet-machine and a single job after job b on M2. It is easy to verify
that the resulting assignment is a NE. Its makespan is m+ 3.
Claim 3.11 If a 3D-matching of size n does not exist then every NE schedule has makespan at
least 2m− 1.
Proof: Let s be a NE profile of an instance for which a matching does not exist. By the
above observations, there are exactly n triplet-machines on which the first element is not from
D. Since a matching does not exist, for at least one such machine, there are at most two jobs
from X ∪ Y ∪ Z whose priority is higher than the priority of the unit jobs. Thus, at least one
job from X ∪ Y ∪ Z prefers M2, and is assigned after d2. As a result, job b prefers M1, where
it can start being processed at time 2. Given that job b is on M1, and that there are at least
m− 1 unit jobs on each machine, job a cannot start its processing earlier than m− 1, implying
that its completion time is at least 2m− 1.
4 General Congestion Games with Priority Lists
In this last section we consider a generalization of the model that allows for arbitrary strategy
sets. First, we show that a Nash equilibrium need not exist and in fact, the question whether
a Nash equilibrium exists is NP-complete, even for unweighted players. Recall that in our
unweighted singleton game a NE is guaranteed to exist. Second, we show a tight upper bound
on the price of anarchy for the sum of weighted costs.
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4.1 Unweighted Games
In this subsection, we restrict ourselves to unweighted congestion games with priority lists, i.e.,
wi = 1 for all i ∈ N . We first provide an example that shows that a Nash equilibrium need not
exist. Farzad et al. [16] give a different example with two players for which a NE need not exist.
Our example describes a symmetric game.
Example 4.1 The game G? contains 3 unweighted players, wi = 1 for all i ∈ N , and 6 resources.
Each players i ∈ N has two pure strategies: {e1, e2, e3} and {e4, e5, e6}. The delays are equal
to 1 for all resources, and the priority lists are pij(i) = i + j − 1 (modulo 3) for all j ∈ E and
i ∈ N . Observe that there is no Nash equilibrium if all three players choose the same three
resources. Also, due to the Condorcet paradox [12], there is no Nash equilibrium in which two
players choose one subset of resources and the other player chooses the other. Specifically, one
of these two players has cost 5 and the other has cost 4. By deviating to the other triplet of
resources, the player whose cost is 5 can reduce its cost to 4.
A natural question is to decide whether a game instance with unweighted players have a NE
profile. Our next result shows that this is an NP-hard task. The hardness proof is different from
the one in Theorem 2.1, since this proof considers unweighted players and multiple-resources
strategies, while that proof is for weighted players and singleton strategies.
Theorem 4.1 Given an instance of a congestion game with priority lists, it is NP-complete to
decide whether the game has a NE profile. This is valid also for unweighted players.
Proof: Given a profile, s, verifying that it is a NE can be done in polynomial time by
considering the players one after the other, and checking, for each players, whether its current
strategy is its best-response to the other players’ strategies in s.
The hardness proof is by a reduction from 4-exact cover. The input to the 4-exact cover
problem, for a given n, is a set U = {a1, . . . , a4n} of elements, and a set Q of subsets of U .
Every element in Q is a set of 4 elements from U . The goal is to decide whether there exists
a subset Q′ ⊆ Q, such that |Q′| = n, and every element in U appears exactly once in Q′.
For example, let U = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h}, and Q = {{a, b, c, d}, {c, d, e, f}, {e, f, g, h}}. Then
the answer is positive for Q′ = {{a, b, c, d}, {e, f, g, h}}. 3-exact cover is one of Karp’s 21 NP-
complete problems [25]. By adding dummy elements to an instance of 3-exact cover, it is easy
to extend the hardness to cover by 4-sets.
Recall that G? is our no-NE game described above. The idea is to construct a game consisting
of n copies of G?, and additional resources and strategies. Recall that G? is a 3-player game. In
the game we construct, if a matching of size n exists, then no copy of G? attracts three players,
while if the maximum matching has size less than n, then at least one copy of G? attracts three
players and no NE exists.
Given an instance of 4-exact cover, we construct a game with 4n players and 10n resources as
follows. First, for every element in U we have one resource. In addition, for every 1 ≤ k ≤ n, we
have a copy of the 6 resources of G?, specifically, E?k = {ek1, ek2, ek3, ek4, ek5, ek6}. All the resources
have the same linear cost function ce(x) = x.
For every 1 ≤ k ≤ n, we have three players. The first is denoted P 1k , and its strategy space
consists of all sets of four resources from U that form an element in Q, and the two strategies
of player 1 in G?, played over the resources E?k , that is, {ek1, ek2, ek3} and {ek4, ek5, ek6}. The two
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additional players are denoted P 2k and P
3
k , and their strategy space consists of the two strategies
of Players 2 and 3 in G?, played over the resources Ek, that is, {ek1, ek2, ek3} and {ek4, ek5, ek6}.
We turn to specify the resources’ priority lists: The resources of E?k have the same priority
lists as in G?, where the players P 1k , P
2
k , P
3
k correspond to players 1, 2, 3 respectively. The priority
lists of the resources in U are arbitrary.
We show that G has a NE if and only if a matching of size n exists. First, if an exact cover
Q′ of size n exists, then the following profile is a NE: For every 1 ≤ k ≤ n, player P k1 selects
the four resources corresponding to subset k in Q′, player P k2 selects {ek1, ek2, ek3} and player P k3
selects {ek4, ek5, ek6}. The cost of every player P k1 is 4 - since it is the only user of four resources.
The cost of every player P k2 or P
k
3 is 3 - since each of them is the only user of three resources.
It is easy to verify that this profile is a NE.
Assume that no exact cover of size n exists. Thus, in every profile, at least one resource
from U is used by at least two players P k11 and P
k2
1 . The cost of one of these players, say P
k1
1 ,
is therefore at least 5, and deviating to a strategy in G?k1 is beneficial for it. Specifically, by
deviating to {ek11 , ek13 , ek13 }, its cost reduces to 4. Thus, if no matching of size n exists, then for
at least one 1 ≤ k ≤ n, the player P k1 is trapped in our no-NE game G?k and the whole game
has no NE.
4.2 Equilibrium Inefficiency
We consider the sum of weighted players’ costs as a measure of the quality of a strategy profile.
Our analysis below is for linear cost functions, and is trivially extended to affine cost functions.
A game G is said to be (λ, µ)-smooth if for all strategy profiles s, s′ we have∑
i∈N
costi(s
′
i, s−i) ≤ λ · cost(s′) + µ · cost(s).
It is well-known (Roughgarden [31]), that if the game G is (λ, µ)-smooth with λ > 0 and
µ < 1, then PoA(G)≤ λ1−µ . Moreover, these bounds are valid for mixed, correlated and coarse-
correlated equilibria.
Theorem 4.2 Every congestion game with resource-specific priority lists is
(
2, 12
)
-smooth. Hence
PoA(G) ≤ 4.
Proof: Given a strategy profile s, define we(s) =
∑
i′∈N :e∈si′
wi′ . For all s, s
′,
∑
i∈N
costi(s
′
i, s−i) ≤
∑
i∈N
∑
e∈s′i
wi · ce · (we(s) + wi) =
∑
e∈E
ce ·
we(s′) · we(s) + ∑
i∈N :e∈s′i
w2i
 ≤
≤
∑
e∈E
ce ·
we(s′)2 + 1
4
· we(s)2 +
∑
i∈N :e∈s′i
w2i
 ≤ 2 · cost(s′) + 1
2
· cost(s),
where the second inequality follows from
(
we(s
′)− 12 · we(s)
)2 ≥ 0 and the third inequality from
cost(s) =
∑
e∈E
1
2 · ce ·
(
we(s)
2 +
∑
i∈N :e∈si w
2
i
)
for all s.
Correa and Queyranne [13] give an example that shows that the bound of 4 is tight for
restricted singleton congestion games with priority lists derived from Smith’s rule. In fact, their
example can be adjusted so that the equilibrium is unique and thus yields a lower bound for the
price of stability.
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